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IN, THE SUPRE,ME COURT 
of the 
STATE Of UTAH 
DYLE E. STONE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HURST LUMBER COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries whereby the 
plaintiff was struck by an employee of the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury in the District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah, with the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist presiding. From a verdict and a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of One Thou-
sand Seven Hundred Nine and no/100 ($1,709.00) 
Dollars, the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks for reversal of the trial court's 
judgment and requests judgment in its favor as a matter 
of law, or that failing, requests a new trial. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose from an assault and battery by a 
deliveryman, employed by the defendant lumber com-
pany, upon the plaintiff who was a foreman at a con-
struction site. 
On or about the 12th day of June, 1962, the defend-
ant's employee, Marlin Morris, delivered a load of lumber 
to a construction site where the plaintiff was employed. 
When the employee of the defendant had finished un-
loading the said lumber, an argument arose between 
the said employee and the plaintiff as to the abilities 
of the deliveryman. The deliveryman struck the plaintiff 
which caused the plaintiff some physical injury, with 
the probability of a slight concussion, which did place the 
plaintiff under a doctor's care for a period of time. 
The defendant lumber company upon hearing of 
the unauthorized act of its employee, immediately dis-
charged the said employee Morris. The said employee of 
defendant had only been in their hire from nine to twelve 
days. His employment had been secured by the defendant 
by contacting the Employment Security Office. The Em-
ployment Security Office knew of defendant's needs for 
a driver-deliveryman. This understanding, was that the 
defendant lumber company needed a deliveryman who 
would not only perform as such, but who would also 
make a good public representation in that said company 
employed no outside salesmen. It was the contention of 
the defendant company that they had no knowledge of 
prior vicious nature of the employee nor any other pro-
blems with him during his nine to twelve day stay with 
them. To support this, the president of the defendant 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
company testified as to the employee's good nature and 
was supported by other employees who had worked along 
side the employee; their testimony gave support to the 
good nature of the individual. 
Plaintiff contends that defendant knew, or should 
have known, that the employee of defendant was of a 
vicious nature and temperament. In support of the 
same, he offered testimony of plaintiff's brother who 
claimed that one of defendant's employees said there had 
been some trouble with the employee. There was also 
testimony presented by the plaintiff, that a subsequent 
employer had found the said employee to be hot-tempered, 
but there was no evidence of his striking anyone prior to 
the employment by the defendant or after his discharge 
by the defendant. 
The lower court held that under a prior Utah case, 
Barney vs. Jewel Tea Company, 103 Ut. 595, 139 P2d 
878 ( 1943), that at the time the employee struck the 
plaintiff he was not acting within the scope of his em-
ployment, however, the trial court submitted to the jury 
the question of whether or not the defendant was negli-
gent in selecting or retaining this employee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A 
VERDICT OF NON SUIT AT THE END OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S CASE. 
The plaintiff in this action presented a case with 
facts very similar to those raised in a prior Utah case of 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Barney vs. Jewel Tea Company, 103 Ut. 595, 139 P2d 
878 ( 1943). 
In the Jewel Tea Company case the court was pre-
sented with a corporation which was engaged in the 
business of selling merchandise through agents who 
called at the homes of individuals. This merchandise 
consisted mostly of grocery products. 
The company had in its employ as an agent going 
from house to house, a Mr. Davis, who in the process of 
his duties of selling and collecting for the company be-
came entangled in an altercation with one of the custom-
ers over the payment of an account. The plaintiff in this 
case refused to make further installment payments until 
the agent had properly credited her account; the agent 
became angered and precipitated the plaintiff into a 
rock garden and there followed a general physical con-
test in which the plaintiff suffered physical injuries. 
The court discussed the rule of a principal being 
liable for a tort committed by its agent when said tort 
was done during the course of his employment, even 
though the act resulting in the tort was not in the 
furtherance of the principal's interest or duties entrusted 
to the agent. Justice Wade, speaking for the court, on 
page 879, in commenting on the California Rule which 
holds the principal liable for the torts committed by an 
agent during the course of his employment had this 
to say: 
"We believe the better rule to be that a principal 
is not liable for the wilful tort of an agent which is 
committed during the course of his employment 
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unless it is committed in the furtherance of his em-
ployer's interest or unless the employment is 
such that the use of force could be' ,contemplated in 
its accomplishment." 
The court in supporting the above rule quoted Mos-
kins Stores, Inc., vs. DeHart <Ind.) 29 NE 2d 948-9; 
Mecham on Agency, 2nd Ed. Vol. 2, Sec. 1978, pp. 1540-
43; and American Law Institute's Restatement of the 
Law of Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 245, pp. 547, 548. 
In a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Wolfe, the 
Justice summed up the basic principals underlying the 
decision wherein he said on Page 882: 
"If, then, we accept the thesis which seems the best 
justification for the doctrine of respondeat superior 
i.e. master as cause for the injury in that he started 
the servant on his course, in cases of wilful tort or 
the wilful invasion of plaintiff's person by force, 
the master cannot be held to be the cause where 
there is a departure from the employment or, if no 
departure, the agent is not acting for what he con-
ceives to be for the master's interests but for the 
purpose of venting his spleen on the plaintiff even 
though the spleen arose from transactions which 
were in the course of the employment. Whether we 
think of force used for personal purposes as not 
being within the realm of apprehensibility or because 
it itself breaks the chain of causation leading back to 
the master makes no difference. The result is the 
same. Under the facts of this cas~ Davis in his use 
of force was not acting to advance the interests of 
his master nor to accomplish objects within the line 
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of his duties and the action of the appellant in send-
ing him on his course was not in any sense a legal 
cause of the assault. I, therefore, concur." 
It might be noted that in the Jewel Tea Company 
case all the Supreme Court Judges concurred in the 
decision. 
In comparing the facts of the case before us with 
the above said Jewel Tea Company case, we find stronger 
argument for holding the principal liable in the Jewel Tea 
Case, on the basis that in the present case, the employee 
of the defendant lumber company had no duty to collect 
accounts. His duties were merely those of delivery of 
lumber products and to present a good impression upon 
the customers of said company. However, it is a logical 
assumption that an agent given the duty of collecting, 
as in the Jewel Tea Company case, would. be more apt 
to run into altercations with the principal's customers. 
It must be remembered also, that in the present case the 
altercation seems to have arisen from some personal ques-
tion as to the intelligence or abilities of the defendant's 
employee, which would have no bearing or connection 
with the lumber company's business. A final fact which 
was brought out in the trial court to even further streng-
then the defendant lumber company's case, was that when 
the altercation commenced, the defendant's employee had 
finished unloading the ordered materials and was pre-
paring to depart, <Transcript, page 19). 
The defendant in this case, at the close of plaintiff's 
case, requested on the basis of the Jewel Tea Company 
case and the facts presented by the plaintiff, that the de-
fendant be granted a non suit. The trial court refused the 
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same and it is defendant's contention that in so doing 
erred. 
POINT II: 
THE COURT ERRED IN THAT THERE WAS 
NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF FOR THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
TO BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY. 
In consideration of the foregoing Point No. I, if the 
trial court was correct in not applying the case of the 
Barney vs. Jewel Tea Company, 103 Ut. 595, 139 P2d 878 
<1943), and if said court, as a result thereof, did not err 
when it refused to grant defendant's motion for non suit, 
then it can be assumed it was proper to consider the 
question of whether or not the defendant was negligent 
in hiring the employee Marlin Morris, if it knew or should 
have known, that said individual was of a vicious nature 
and temperament. 
In considering the question of negligence of de-
fendant's hiring of a vicious natured employee, it is the 
defendant's contention in this case, that if this question 
is to be considered, there was not sufficient evidence 
presented by the plaintiff for the matter to go before the 
jury. The plaintiff in this case offered the contested 
testimony of the brother of the plaintiff, Ronald Stone, 
who claimed that the yard foreman, Darlis Youngberg, 
of the defendant lumber company, had told him that they 
had had trouble with the employee, Marlin Morris, on a 
prior occasion. The recorded testimony as given by the 
brother, as to this admission of bad temperament of 
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defendant's employee is on pages 32 and 33 of the Tran-
script and is as follows: 
"A ..... He said, 'he is kind of hot headed. I warned 
him before.' . . . . . '' 
Plaintiff further offered, over the objection of the 
defendant, testimony of a subsequent employer of the 
employee, Marlin Morris, who testified as to the employee 
being hot tempered. The said testimony of the subsequent 
employer appears on page 115 of the Transcript and the 
pertinent quotation is as follows: 
"Q. Did you ever see him (Marlin Morris) person-
ally strike anybody? 
A. I haven't seen him strike, but I had to separate 
him from, I would say hitting a man once, threatened 
to, but he didn't actually do it." 
It should be noted that this is the only evidence 
presented by the plaintiff in this case to show a vicious 
nature on the part of defendant's employee and the 
plaintiff offered no testimony showing that this employee 
had on any occasion, prior to or subsequent to the assault 
complained of, struck or attacked any other individual. 
In construing the plaintiff's case in the most favor-
able light and if the testimony of the plaintiff's brother 
is to be believed rather than the defendant's employee 
who denied making any admission to plaintiff's brother, 
(Transcript, page 66), the most that plaintiff can argue 
is that defendant's employee Marlin Morris, may have 
been hot tempered. This being the case, the question is: 
Is this enough to show negligence on the part of the 
employer? It is important to note that the general author-
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ities speaking on this question do not follow a theory of 
hot temperedness, but more of a violent and vicious 
nature. 
34 A.L.R. 2d 390 ( 1954), sets forth the rule of an 
employer's negligence in selection or retention of an 
employee: 
"As has already been noted, a duty imposed upon 
an employer who invites the general public to his 
premises, and whose employees are brought into 
contact with the members of such public in the 
course of the master's business, is that of exercising 
reasonable care for the safety of his customers, pa-
trons, or other invitees. It has been held that in 
fulfilling such duty, an employer must use due care 
to avoid the selection or retention of an employee 
whom he knows or should know is a person unwor-
thy, by habits, temperament, or nature, to deal with 
the persons invited to the premises by the employer. 
The employer's knowledge of past acts of improp-
riety, violence, or disorder on the part of the employee 
is generally considered sufficient to forewarn the 
employer who selects or retains such employee in 
his service that he may eventually commit an assault, 
although not every infirmity of character, such, for 
example, as dishonesty or querulousness, will lead 
to such result . ..... " 
Note that in the rule as stated by the quotation from 
A.L.R. 2d above that which has been underlined points 
out that an employer's knowledge of past acts of violence 
on the part of an employee will generally b~ considered 
sufficient to forewarn, however, the mere character of 
quarrelsomeness does not seem enough to fasten liability. 
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This comparison of a hot tempered employee to one 
of violent or vicious nature is considered in 6 Am. Jur. 
2d Assault and Battery Sec. 134 p. 113: 
"Pursuant to the general theory that an employer 
is bound to exercise reasonable care for the safety 
of his customers, patrons, or other invitees, with 
whom an employee ,may come in contact on the 
employer's premises or in connection with the em-
ployer's business, it is generally recognized that an 
employer may be held liable for an assault or battery 
committed by his employee against a customer, 
patron, or invitee, if he has selected or retained in 
his employment an employee whose violent propen-
sities were known, or should have been known, to 
him, and a causal connection can be shown between 
the employer's negligence in the selection of his em-
ployee and the tort committed by the employee. 
" 
The words used again imply far more than merely 
a quarrelsome or hot tempered nature and it will be noted 
that the nature of an employee for liability to fasten upon 
the employer, as used above, is violent propensities. 
Prosser, Prosser on Torts, (2 Ed.) Sec. 63, pp. 354, 
353, implies that this duty owed by an employer to his 
customers is mainly confined to certain industries: 
" . . . . . It may be said, in general, that the master 
may be liable for assault and battery, false imprison-
ment, malicious prosecution, defamation, or misre-
presentations made by the servant, where the em-
ployment is of a kind likely to lead to such torts, or 
10 
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to furnish an opportunity and incentive for them, 
and the servant. is motivated at least in part by a 
desire to serve the master. Thus, a railway ticket 
agent who assaults, arrests and slanders a passenger, 
in the belief that he has been given a piece of coun-
terfeit money, is within the scope of his employment, 
although the employer has not authorized such con-
duct. But if he acts from purely personal motives, 
because of a quarrel not in the employer's interests, 
he is considered to have departed from his employ-
ment, and the master is not liable. 
Even where the servant's ends are entirely personal, 
the master may be under such a duty to the plaintiff 
that responsibility for the servant's acts may not be 
delegated to him. This is true, in particular, in those 
cases in which the master, by contract or otherwise, 
has entered into some relation requiring him to be 
responsible for the protection of the plaintiff. It is 
on this basis, for example, that carriers, innkeepers 
and hospitals have been held liable for personal at-
tacks made by, their servants on their premises. The 
only justification for such a result is that the great 
responsibility undertaken requires that the master 
shall, at his peril, choose servants who will not com-
mit such torts." -
Certainly by no stretch of the imagination can a 
truck driver deliveryman fit into the industries mentioned 
by Prosser above. 
In the area of case law supporting the rule on the 
question of an employer's negligence in selecting or re-
taining a servant with known vicious propensities, there 
11 
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have been some recent supporting decisions. In a leading 
case considering the above theory, Murray vs. Modoc 
State Bank 181 Kan. 642, 313 P2d 304 ( 1957), there was 
the fact situation of a bank branch manager assaulting 
and thereby injuring a customer of said bank. In this 
case, the branch manager had been employed by the 
defendant bank for approximately two years and during 
said employment he had assaulted the plaintiff Murray 
on one occasion in the bank; the branch manager of the 
defendant had become so antagonistic to the plaintiff that 
the plaintiff refused to continue his banking transactions 
except by mail. This irritated the defendant's employee 
so that the employee went to the home of the plaintiff and 
during an altercation over the plaintiff's banking by mail, 
the employee for the second time assaulted and injured 
the plaintiff. It was shown in the trial court that the em-
ployer had knowledge of this antagonism between the 
branch manager and the plaintiff and was aware of the 
first assault of the branch manager upon the plaintiff. 
It should be further noted that at the time the said 
branch manager went to the plaintiff's home the alterca-
tion thereafter was concerning and over plaintiff's bank-
ing practices. With the facts before it in this case, the 
court overruled the demure to plaintiff's petition alleging 
that the plaintiff had a cause of action. 
Justice Schroeder speaking for the court on page 309 
had this to say as to the theory of the case: 
"We hold that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
is not involved in the instant case. Construing the 
pleading most favorably to the petitioner as we must, 
the issue presented is whether the employer, the 
12 
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Modoc State Bank, was negligent in retaining its 
managing officer, Breithaupt, who had propensities 
toward violence." 
Notice that the court used the word violence and as 
the facts pointed out in this case there was no question 
of a violent propensity on the part of the employee, and 
the employer defendant was certainly forewarned of such 
violent nature when the employee assaulted the plaintiff 
the first time. Thus we see a case where the rule was 
supported, but in supporting said rule, the court did so 
with evidence showing a violent nature in the employee, 
a prior occasion of violent assault by said employee upon 
the plaintiff in defendant's bank and that the employee 
assaulted the plaintiff because of a difference of opinion 
as to the proper banking methods to be followed by the 
plaintiff. The court in its discussion cites many other 
cases to support the rule, however, it will be noted that 
these cases all were of employees with extreme violent and 
vicious natures. 
The Modoc State Bank case cited a case which did 
not meet the requirements for finding a negligent em-
ployer as to the above rule. This was the case of Balin 
vs. Lysle Rishel Post No. 68, American Legion, 177 Kan. 
520, 280 P2d 623 ( 1955). In this case the court was pre-
sented with the fact situation whereby an- employee was 
accidentally shot by another employee of a defendant 
hotel keeper. It was brought out in the trial court that 
the defendant hotel keeper had knowledge that the em-
ployee causing the injury to the plaintiff was in the habit 
of keeping a .22 rifle in his room and on prior occassions 
had actually shot at birds from a hotel window. The only 
13 
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evidence presented by plaintiff that the defendant em-
ployer had knowledge of any misconduct of its employee 
was the defendant's knowledge of the shooting at pigeons 
from the hotel windows, and the fact that the employee 
had repaired some firearms in the checkroom of the hotel. 
The plaintiff prese~ted its case on the theory that the 
defendant was negligent in retaining an employee who it 
knew had worked on firearms in the checkroom and shot 
pigeons from the window. In support of its contention, 
the plaintiff cited cases involving an employer being held 
liable where its employee had been known to have made 
previous assaults on guests, a case of an employee having 
an unusual and abnormally high temper, a case where an 
employee was prone to engage in the act of dangerous 
horseplay and where an employee worked for an apart-
ment house was known to be a drunkard, incompetent~ 
and dangerous. 
Justice Thiele, speaking for the court on page 630 
pointed out that the evidence before the court did not 
show negligence on the part of the employer: 
"If it be assumed, as plaintiff contends, that at the 
time of the shooting he was not then in the relation 
of servant to the master, the corporation, and that 
the rule is that a master may be liable for injuries 
to a third person which are the direct results of the 
incompetence or unfitness of his servant, either where 
he was negligent in employing him or in retaining 
him when the master knew or should have known 
of such incompetence or unfitness, and we need not 
expend on that rule, see 57 C.J.S., master and servant, 
section 559, page 270, 35 Am. Jur. 978, the evidence 
14 
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now under consideration does not show that the 
master corporation hired an incompetent or unfit 
servant or employee, or that it retained him in em-
ployment after it knew or should have known of his 
incompetence or unfitness - it does not even show 
the servant incompetent or unfit ..... " 
The above court finding insufficient evidence of 
negligence on the part of the employer affirmed a ruling 
for the defendant. 
The State of Washington faced with this question 
of negligence of an employer in selecting or retaining a 
vicious employee, LaLone vs. Smith 39 Wash. 2d 167, 
234 P2d 893 ( 1951 ) , supported the rule but once again 
this was a case whereby the employer had knowledge of 
a violent temper, prior assaults on tenants of the defend-
ant and of the employee's drunkenness while on the pre-
mises of the defendant. In this case, the evidence showed 
that after the defendant employer had been forewarned 
of an assault committed by his employee that the em-
ployee at a later date in a drunken rage assaulted plaintiff 
inflicting serious personal injuries upon him. With these 
facts and evidence before the court, the defendant could 
not deny that it had warning of employee's vicious pro-
pensities. Chief Justice Schwellenbach, stating the hold-
ing of the court affirming the judgment of the trial ,court 
on page 897, had this to say: 
"To the facts of this case, as found by the trial 
court, we must apply the rule of law that an employ-
er is liable to a third person for injuries inflicted upon 
him by an employee who has been retained in em-
ployment after the employer knows, or ought to 
15 
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know, that because of his vicious temperament or 
propensities he is likely to assault persons during 
the course of his employment. See 35 Am. Jur. 1006, 
master and servant, Sec. 573." 
Notice again that the court based its finding on 
evidence showing undisputable prior knowledge of em-
ployee's temperament, an employee of a vicious tempera-
ment prone to heavy drinking. This again points out the 
difference between a mere characteristic of quick temper 
and that of a vicious and dangerous temperament; cer-
tainly there is no comparison between the two and in 
construing these characteristics the same, a proper theory 
of law may be stretched beyond its proper boundaries. 
Another recent case which cites both the LaLone 
vs. Smith case and the Murray vs. Modoc State Bank 
case is the Svacek vs. Shelley ____ Alaska ____________ , 359 P2d 
127 <1961). In this case, a tenant of the employer was 
seriously injured by an assault by an employee of the 
defendant. The evidence brought forth at the trial court 
brought out that the defendant had been warned of the 
employee's reputation of a "knifer" and as being a vicious 
person. This reputation of the employee of the defendant 
was further supported by witnesses who testified as to 
the employee being a "knifer" prior to the assault upon 
the plaintiff. Defendant even admitted of having know-
ledge of the employee being in a fight on her premises 
and of the prior warnings of his being dangerous. Here 
again we find a case supporting the rule of negligence on 
the part of an employer in selecting or retaining a vicious 
employee, however, the evidence once again showed not 
a mere question of temper but a disposition which was 
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dangerous and had on prior occasions been demonstrated 
to the defendant employer as such. 
Other jurisdictions have faced the problem of this 
rule and decided cases on the same basic extent of evi-
dence. The case of Fleming vs. Brofin -------- App. D.C. 
····--------, 104 Atlantic 2d 407 ( 1954), held against a 
plaintiff housewife who was assaulted by a deliveryman 
for a defendant grocery store. The evidence brought forth 
that there was nd prior information to put the defendant 
on notice of the dangerous nature of the employee and 
that the defendant's investigation consisted of no more 
than telephoning a prior employer where the employee 
had previously worked. 
In another case of Porter vs. Thompson 357 Mo. 31, 
206 SW 2d 509 <1947), where an employee of the de-
fendant shot the husband of the plaintiff in a restaurant 
where the employee went during his working hours. This 
case was considered on the heretofore said rule of employ-
er's negligence as stated above and the court found in 
favor of the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had 
to show that defendant knew or should have known of 
the employee's vicious propensities. It was brought out 
that the employee on prior occasions in the same restaur-
ant had been rude and threatening to customers and this 
had been so reported to the police but not the defendant, 
and further, on one occasion had threatened to kill a 
janitor for a car loading company, and that the same had 
been reported to the employer of said employee. The 
court supported the defendant's position on the basis that 
there was not sufficient evidence to show defendant knew 
or should have known of its employee's dangerous and 
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VIcious propensities. Justice Bradley speaking for the 
court on page 512 summed up the court's holding for the 
defendant as follows: 
"Under the law it is quite clear that plaintiff did 
not make a submissable case under the rule of res-
pondeat superior. Did she make a submissable case 
on the theory that respondeat was negligent in em-
ploying a watchman of vicious propensities and that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the death 
of plaintiff's husband? As above stated, if it be as-
sumed that Robinson was of vicious propensities, 
that alone would not make respondeat liable. The 
burden was on plaintiff to show that respondeat 
knew or should have known Robinson's propensities, 
and there was no substantial evidence tending to 
show so ...... " 
In consideration of the above cases both for and 
against the rule of an employer's selecting or retaining a 
servant who it knew or should have known of the danger-
ous propensities of the servant, it is clear that the cases 
holding for the rule show a far greater degree of clear 
and convincing evidence of defendant's knowlege than 
has been presented in this case now on appeal. As stated 
earlier, it would seem that in construing the plaintiff's 
case in the most favorable light from the evidence present-
ed at the trial court, all that could be said of the employee 
of the defendant lumber company was that he may have 
had a hot temper. Certainly this is far removed from the 
vicious nature and character of the employees in the cases 
which have held for the plaintiffs in the heretofore said 
rule. The evidence in this case shows an employee who 
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was hired through the Employment Security Office 
<Transcript, p. 87), as defendant had done before for 
many years without any incidents and who had no 
knowledge of any prior bad disposition on the part of 
the employee; and that during the short nine to twelve 
day period of the employee's employment with the lumber 
company, there was no evidence of any true vicious 
nature and in fact any evidence that the defendant had 
any trouble with the employee was strongly contested 
by defendant's employees, <Transcript, p. 63, 78, 102, 
and 109). It must be remembered that plaintiff at no 
time gave any evidence of the employee physically as-
saulting an individual prior to or after the assault of 
which plaintiff complains. It would appear from prior 
cases that plaintiff in order to recover would need evi-
dence of more vicious and dangerous characteristics on 
the part of this employee, prior to or during his employ-
ment with the defendant lumber company. 
POINT III: 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE JURY 
TO FIND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT IV: 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PLAIN-
TIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE AS TO EMPLOYEE 
MARLIN MORRIS' SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT. 
The trial court in allowing a subsequent employer 
to testify that the employee of the defendant showed a 
nature of a hot temper was highly prejudicial and did 
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not show that the defendant had any knowledge or should 
have known of the employee's disposition. 
POINT V: 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES TO BE A'W ARDED. 
In 6 Am. Jur. 2d. Sec. 187, p. 154, the general rule 
for the awarding of punitive damages is laid out as 
follows: 
"As a general rule, punitive damages are awarded in 
addition to compensatory damages where an assault 
and battery is committed in a wanton and malicious 
manner or under other circumstances of aggreva-
tion." 
If in fact it could be held that the defendant was 
negligent in the hiring and retention of the employee in 
this case, it would appear unjust to say that its negligence 
was wanton and malicious in manner. Certainly there 
was no malice or a wanton reckless disregard of the rights 
and safety of others or gross negligence on the part of the 
defendant. The facts and evidence in this case are hard 
put to show the necessary elements of negligence alone. 
CONCLUSION 
In considering alLthe elements of this case, we find 
that the record shows an employee not acting within the 
scope of his employment, however, the question of his 
being of violent and of dangerous nature was put in issue. 
In repetition of what has been said before, looking at the 
plaintiff's case in a most favorable light and believing 
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only the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the most 
that can be said about this employee of the defendant 
lumber company, is that he may have been of hot temper. 
Was this enough to hold him to be of violent and danger-
ous propensities? It was the defendant's contention that it 
was not; nor was it proper in allowing testimony of a 
subsequent employer's prejudicial evidence to be introdu-
ced erroneously. It would appear from the cases which 
would support plaintiff's position, that plaintiff had to 
show a great deal more in the way of a dangerous individ-
ual than was shown in the instant case. Further, there was 
no evidence introduced to show any knowledge or means 
by which the employer could have known that this in-
dividual employee may have had a hot temper. 
It is worthy of mention that some authorities have 
considered the problem of scope of employment and negli-
gence in the selection or retention of an employee togeth-
er, and come to the conclusion that the two can not be 
separated. In 6 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 134, p. 113, this view 
is outlined: 
" ..... Some authorities take the view, however, that 
an employer's liability for negligence in the selection 
or retention of an employee· can be asserted only 
where the employee, in committing the tortuous act, 
acted within the scope of his employment, and that, 
since the employer is vicariously liable under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior for acts committed 
by the employee within the scope of his employment, 
the employer's liability on the ground of negligence 
in the selection or retention of an employee is merely 
a particular application of the employer's vicarious 
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liability for acts committed by the employee within 
the scope of his employment ..... " 
The above is mentioned only to point out that if 
the court is to distinguish this case from Barney vs. Jewel 
Tea Company case then it may be according to some 
authorities that there remains some connection to still 
make the said Jewel Tea Case applicable in part to this 
problem. 
The defendant in the instant case has complied with 
all the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it by 
law and it is respectfully submitted that the verdict and 
judgment of the District Court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALE T. BROWNING 
PHILLIP H. BROWNING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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